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AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
OF STOCK DIVIDENDS-IN-KIND

L. Paige Fields and Michael S. Wilkins
Texas A & M University

Abstract
We investigate share price reactions to announcements of dividends payable
in the common stock of corporations different from the issuing firm. We find that
firms that declare these dividends (typically investment companies) experience positive
abnormal returns upon announcement. We also find that such dividends are more
likely to be declared when the shares to be distributed have peaked in value.
Consistent with this finding, we document negative announcement-period abnormal
returns for firms having their shares distributed. Additional tests reveal that prices
respond more negatively when the information signal is strongest, when outside
ownership is more dispersed, and when management is more entrenched.

I. Introduction
Several studies examine the managerial motives for and economic
consequences of stock dividend declarations (Baker and Gallagher (1980),
Brennan and Copeland (1988), Eisemann and Moses (1978), Grinblatt, Masulis,
and Titman (1984), Lakonishok and Lev (1987), McNichols and Dravid (1990».
In this study we provide an analysis of a type of stock dividend not previously
investigated. Specifically, we focus on stock dividends-in-kind (hereafter SDIK).
SDIKs are common stock dividends declared by one company and payable in the
shares of another company.' Our analysis does not include dividends associated
with spin-offs, mergers, or acquisitions, since these events are of an entirely
different nature.
We examine four primary research questions. First, what are the
characteristics offirms that typically declare SDIKs (hereafter DECLARER firms)
and why are the SDIKs declared? Second, do the firms that have their shares
distributed (hereafter DECLAREE firms) have any characteristics in common?
Third, how do the investors representing both classes of firms react to the SDIK

We would like to thank Dan Dhaliwal, Neil Fargher, Mark Trombley, and an anonymous reviewer for many
helpful comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank Brent Beal for research assistance.
ISDIKs are special cases of property dividends.
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announcements; that is, are there stock valuation effects for DECLARER and/or
DECLAREE firms? Finally, ifan equity valuation effect exists, what firm-specific
factors appear to influence the price reactions? This last question allows us to use
SDIKs as a unique venue for testing some of the commonly proposed theoretical
relations among ownership structure, information effects, and firm value.

II. Firm Characteristics and Testable Hypotheses

DECLARER Firms
Our analysis reveals that almost 80 percent of SDIKs are declared by
investment companies that do not pay regular cash dividends. Therefore,
shareholders of these firms may view the dividends simply as cash dividend
replacements (see Lakonishok and Lev (1987». From the firm's perspective,
however, some motivation must exist for SDIKs to be declared in lieu of cash
dividends. One possible reason is tax related. Before its repeal in 1987, the
General Utilities doctrine afforded SDIKs and comparable distributions
preferential tax treatment. Under this ruling, a firm having appreciated assets
could distribute the assets to stockholders with a "step-up" in basis. For tax
purposes, no gain would be recognized from the distribution. Investors should
view such an opportunity favorably; therefore, ceteris paribus, SDIK announcements should result in a positive average share price response for DECLARER
firms.'
It is not clear, however, that firms would elect such distributions based
solely on preferential tax treatment. Another possibility is that SDIKS are declared
when the DECLARER firm believes that the DECLAREE firm's stock has
reached its maximum value and the price will soon decline, or that the shares are
overvalued. Assuming recipient shareholders can sell their shares at this maximum
value, the average price response for DECLARER firms should be positive. On
the other hand, if the distribution is made because the DECLAREE firm has been
performing poorly, DECLARER shareholders may react negatively because they
are being given a security with little value. This contention, of course, must be
tempered with the realization that investors may view "something" as superior to
"nothing." Accordingly, a positive stock price response under these conditions
may still be plausible.

20ur expectation of a positive valuation effect for DECLARER firms assumes the dividend itself is
unexpected or that the amount of the dividend is larger than expected. Our findings suggest that most
DECLARER firms are small and receive little attention in the financial press. Thus, dividend announcements
for these firms are more likely to contain "new information" and are more likely to affect share prices.
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DECLAREE Firms
Information Effects. The declaration of an SDIK may indicate that
DECLARER firm management believes (1) the DECLAREE firm's shares have
peaked in value or (2) the firm has been performing poorly and there is little hope
for the future. Both scenarios imply that future earnings may be poor, relative to
past earnings. Accordingly, an SDIK announcement may send a negative signal
to DECLAREE shareholders, resulting in a decrease in share prices at announcement. Assuming the information signal is accurate, post-announcement share price
performance should be negative as well.
Management Ownership Concentration. Regardless of the motivation for
SDIKs, they may enhance the relative power of DECLAREE management.
Specifically, because a block of potentially valuable outside ownership is being
dissolved, nonmanagement ownership becomes more dispersed, resulting in
increased managerial power. Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that managers are
more likely to engage in firm value-maximizing behavior when they control a
substantial portion of their firms' shares. As management power increases,
decreases in agency costs arising from an alignment of interests cause firm value
to rise. Thus, the DECLAREE share price reaction should be positive.
More recently, however, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that management
may become entrenched at high levels of ownership. As management becomes
more powerful they may be able to escape market discipline, thereby decreasing
firm value. Therefore, DECLAREE reactions to SDIK announcements may
depend upon management ownership concentration. In other words, crosssectional price reactions to SDIKs may depend upon the degree to which
DECLAREE management is entrenched.
Outside Ownership Concentration. The "free-rider" problem exists when
a firm has many owners and no one is willing to endure the costs of monitoring
management. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) state that the presence of a large
minority shareholder may partially resolve such a problem. Therefore, firm value
should decrease (increase) when a large block of ownership is dissolved (created),
because of decreased (increased) monitoring. If SDIKs result in the dissolution of
an important block of ownership, a negative effect is expected.
Pound (1988) presents two additional relations that may exist between
outside ownership (defined as institutional ownership) and firm value. A negative
relation may exist if institutional investors vote with management because they
are coerced to maintain a business association. This relation may also obtain when
institutional investors and management find such cooperation mutually beneficial.
Therefore, the firm value effects of decreases in outside ownership concentration
resulting from SDIKs may depend upon the type of institutional block that is
dissolved.

108

The Journal of Financial Research

TABLE I. Selected Summary Statistics for DECLARER and DECLAREE Firms.

N

Variable

Mean

Median

25% Q

75%Q

105.05
0.95
2.77

85.57
0.51
1.50

69.63
0.33
1.04

111.95
0.98
2.74

Panel A. DECLARER Firms
FIRMSIZE
DIVVAL
TOTALVAL

38
44
44

Panel B. DECLAREE Firms
FIRMSIZE
SHRDIST
MGTOWN
RELDIST

44
44
42
44

1209.33
125,979
12.14%
1.27%

440.69
49,833
0.08
0.0035

146.10
26,376
1.00%
0.15%

1055.42
120,796
18.00%
1.04%

Notes: FIRMSIZE is the firm's market value of equity on the Friday before the dividend announcement,
expressed in millions of dollars. DIVVAL is the per-share market value of the distribution, defined as the
number of DECLAREE shares issued per DECLARER share held, multiplied by the market price of the
DECLAREE shares on the Friday before the dividend announcement. TOTAL VAL is the total value of the
dividend distribution (expressed in millions of dollars), defined as the total number of DECLAREE shares
distributed multiplied by the market price of the DECLAREE shares on the Friday before the dividend
announcement. SHRDIST is the total number of DECLAREE shares distributed through the dividend.
MGTOWN is the DECLAREE firm's percent management ownership before the dividend. RELDIST is the
relative size of the SDIK distribution, which is SHRDIST divided by the number of DECLAREE shares
outstanding.

III. Sample Selection and Empirical Method

Sample Selection
We searched Moody's Dividend Record from 1972 to 1989 to form a
preliminary sample consisting of all firms that declared SDIKs. This sample was
then used to search the Wall Street Journal Index for public announcements of
SDIKs. To be included in the final sample, firms must have complete returns data
available on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) NYSE/AMEX or
NASDAQ return files. These criteria result in a final sample of thirty-eight
DECLARER and forty-four DECLAREE stock dividend announcements. The
discrepancy between the number of DECLARER and DECLAREE announcements is due to two factors. First, either firm may have released potentially
contaminating information during the announcement period, which would
eliminate the firm(s) from the analysis. Second, many DECLARER dividends are
payable in shares of more than one DECLAREE firm (in a single announcement),
so a one-to-one match for these dividends does not exist.
Table 1 presents selected summary statistics for the full samples of both
DECLARER and DECLAREE firms. For DECLARER firms, the mean market
value of equity before the announcement (FIRM SIZE) is approximately $105
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million. This is in contrast to the $1.209 billion mean market value of equity for
DECLAREE firms. Although both measures are positively skewed, the median
values ($85.57 million and $440.69 million, respectively) confirm that firms
declaring SDIKs are significantly smaller than firms having their shares
distributed.
Table I also provides data on the monetary value of SDIKs. The mean
market value of the SDIK (DIVVAL) is about ninety-five cents per share, and
each SDIK results in an average of 125,979 DECLAREE shares being distributed
(SHRDIST). The relative size of the distribution (RELDIST) represents a 1.27
percent mean (0.35 percent median) stake in the total shares of the DECLAREE
firm. Given the large size of DECLAREE firms, this stake may represent a
significant monetary interest. We calculate this interest, i.e., the average total
value of the distribution (TOTALVAL), to be approximately $2.77 million.
Although this figure is positively skewed (median = $1.50 million), SDIKs appear
to be associated with substantial transfers of wealth from single blockholders to
dispersed, perhaps less sophisticated, individual investors.

Empirical Method
Average daily common stock abnormal returns are measured around the
SDIK announcement dates. We calculate abnormal returns (ARjt) for the period
beginning twenty-one days before and ending twenty days after the announcement
date using the market model:
(I)

where Rjt is the return of security j for period t and Rm l is the return on the CRSP
NYSE/AMEX or NASDAQ market index for period t. The estimated coefficients
&..j and ~j are calculated using the 160 trading days that end 21 days before the
announcement date.
Tests of statistical significance are based on standardized abnormal
returns, where the standard deviation of the sum of the ARjt series from t = T( to
t = T2 is given by equation (2):3

'Our event study method follows that used by Mikkelson and Partch (\988a, b), a correction of the method
used by Patell (\ 976). The corrected test accounts for serial correlation in abnormal returns within event
windows. The serial correlation is present because all of the abnormal returns are a function of the same OLS
intercept and slope estimators.
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The value
is the mean square error of the market model regression for
firm j, Rm is the mean market index return over the estimation period, N is the
number of returns in the estimation period, and Rm T is the mean market index
return during period T. We define the number of sample observations in the
period from t = T1 to t = T2 as T, where T = T2 - T1 + 1.
Assuming the abnormal returns are multivariate normal and crosssectionally independent, we test the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return
is zero with the following statistic (Z):
1

n

T,

Z=-E E
.;;; j=1

(3)

I=T,

The statistic in equation (3) has an asymptotically unit normal distribution, and
n denotes sample size.

IV. Results and Implications
Firm Characteristics and Motivation for SDIK Declarations

Two of our research questions involve assessing the common characteristics of DECLARER and DECLAREE firms and determining why SDIKs are
declared. Thirty of the thirty-eight DECLARER firms are investment companies
and eight are industrial firms. DECLAREE firms, on the other hand, are diverse
both in size and industry. The only common characteristic we could identify for
DECLAREE firms is the ,existence of consistently positive share price performance during the months before the SDIK announcement. Our data, and anecdotal
evidence as well, suggest this may be an important factor in determining why
SDIKs are declared:
Standard Shares Inc. said it will pay a dividend of 1.9 shares of MeA Inc. common stock for each
100 shares of Standard Shares held.... A spokesman said the payout is in keeping with company
policy of giving to stockholders, through dividends, stock that has appreciated markedly. (Wall Street
Journal, August 4, 1982)

Figure I presents a graph of the cumulative excess returns for
DECLAREE firms before and after the SDIK announcements. Beginning 250
trading days before the SDIK announcement and ending 250 trading days after
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Figure I.

Cumulative Excess Returns for the Sample ofDECLAREE Firms Beginning 250 Days Before
and Ending 250 Days After Announcements of Stock Dividends-in-Kind.

the announcement, we calculate the daily excess return (defined as the individual
firm return minus the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index) for each
firm. This provides 501 excess returns for each firm. These returns are used to
compute an average cross-sectional excess return for each ofthe trading days. The
average excess returns are cumulated geometrically for presentation in Figure I.
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TABLE 2. Percentage Average Abnormal Returns (AR), Z-values (Z), and Cumulative Average
Abnormal Returns (CAR) Around Announcements of Stock Dividends-in-Kind for the
Complete Samples of DECLARER and DECLAREE Firms.
DECLARER Finns
Event Day

AR

-10

-0.249
0.334
-0.157
-0.092
0.397
-0.539
-0.368
0.000
0.180
0.646
0.337
-0.084
-0.669
-0.137
0.175
-0.094
0.126
-0.006
-0.405
-0.093

-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1,0
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Z

-1.329
0.233
-0.734
-0.559
1.914'
-2.263"
-1.626
-0.471
1.812
1.925"
1.258
0.565
-2.972"
-1.001
0.877
-0.164
0.322
-0.657
-2.054"
-0.129

DECLAREE Finns
CAR

AR

-0.249
0.085
-0.072
-0.164
0.233
-0.306
-0.674
-0.674
-0.494
0.152
0.489
0.405
-0.264
-0.401
-0.226
-0.320
-0.194
-0.200
-0.605
-0.698

0.120
0.057
0.256
-0.305
-0.001
-0.124
0.775
0.390
-0.366
-1.426
0.582
-0.601
-0.065
0.330
0.150
0.210
-0.114
-0.027
-0.160
-0.335

Z

0.208
0.069
0.565
-1.063
0.007
-0.392
2.564"
1.253
-1.550
-3.398"
1.697'
-1.256
0.016
1.432
0.469
1.109
-0.262
-0.079
-0.367
-1.130

CAR
0.120
0.177
0.433
0.128
0.127
0.003
0.778
1.168
0.802
-0.624
-0.042
-0.643
-0.708
-0.378
-0.228
-0.018
-0.132
-0.159
-0.319
-0.654

"Significant at the 5 percent level.
'Significant at the 10 percent level.

The pattern of cumulative excess returns indicates the average
DECLAREE firm's price increased dramatically during the months before the
SDIK announcement, then decreased significantly during the post-announcement
period. In other words, the DECLARER firms appear to have distributed the
DECLAREE shares when they were very near their peak values.' The significant
downpricing after the SDIK also suggests that market participants value the
trading decisions of institutional holders highly, and therefore view SDIK
announcements as negative signals of future DECLAREE firm performance. In
sum, the evidence from Figure I is consistent with our prediction that SDIKs are
likely to be declared when share prices reach their maximum value, thus sending
a negative signal to DECLAREE holders.

'Because most DECLARER firms are investment companies that are likely to be well informed about the
firms whose shares they hold, this accurate market timing is not surprising.
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Valuation Effects and Additional Analysis-DECLARER Firms
To illustrate how SDIKs affect DECLARER share prices, we report
average daily and announcement-period abnormal returns for these firms in Table
2. The announcement-period (days -I and 0) average abnormal return of 0.646
percent (Z = 1.925) is significant at the .06 level.' These findings indicate that
DECLARER shareholders view SDIKs favorably, consistent with both the tax and
signaling hypotheses presented earlier.
To explain the cross-sectional variation in announcement-period abnormal
returns for DECLARER firms, we estimate the following ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression model (t-statistics are in parentheses):

ARj T

=

-0.00771 + 0.3644 DIVj ,
(-1.l14)
(4.059)

(4)

In equation (4), ARj T is the two-day abnormal return for firm j and DIV is the
market value of the stock distribution scaled by the DECLARER firm's share
price. The model is significant at the .001 level (F = 16.476) and has an adjusted
R2 of 0.333. Thus, the cross-sectional price response to SDIK announcements is
a positive function of the market value of the SDIK, a result that is both
intuitively and theoretically sound.

Valuation Effects and Additional Analysis-DECLAREE Firms
Table 2 also presents average daily and announcement-period abnormal
returns for DECLAREE firms. DECLAREE firms experience an announcementperiod (days -I and 0) average abnormal return of -1.426 percent (Z = -3.398),
significant at the I percent level. Moreover, the median announcement-period
abnormal return is -1.70 percent, and 76 percent of the sample firms experience
negative share price reaction during the announcement period. The strong negative
average reaction is consistent with the models ofShleifer and Vishny (1986) and
Pound (1988), and it suggests that the companies declaring SDIKs may have
provided valuable monitoring of DECLAREE firms' management.
In addition to the negative DECLAREE price performance during the
announcement period, we detect significant price changes both before and after
the SDIK announcement. The average pre-period cumulative abnormal return
from day -26 to day -2 is 3.67 percent (p < 0.10), while the average post-period
cumulative abnormal return from day I to day 25 is -4.94 percent (p < 0.05).
Thus, DECLAREE prices increased before the announcement, then decreased

'The results are not due to the influence of outliers and are robust to the use of either ordinary least squares
or Scholes and Williams (1977) betas.
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sharply after the announcement. These findings, along with the strong negative
announcement-period response, are consistent with our contention (and the
evidence from Figure I) that DECLARER managers believed the DECLAREE
share prices had peaked. Thus, the information signal sent by the SDIK
announcement to DECLAREE shareholders is negative.
To determine which firm-specific factors influence price reactions to
SDIKs, we investigate the cross-sectional relation between announcement-period
abnormal returns and measures of management ownership concentration,
information effects, and institutional ownership concentration. The relation
between management ownership and abnormal returns is examined in models
(I}-(3) of Table 3.6 Because the effect of the SDIK announcement may vary for
different ranges ofmanagerial ownership concentration (Fama and Jensen (1983»,
we allow for shifts in the OLS regression slope. In models (I}-(3), MGTI,
MGT2, and MGT3 are dummy variables multiplied by the DECLAREE firm's
management ownership concentration before the distribution: 7 D1 equals one if
management ownership is less than 5 percent and zero otherwise; D2 equals one
if management ownership is between 5 percent and 25 percent and zero
otherwise; and D3 equals one if management ownership is greater than 25 percent
and zero otherwise. Our sample includes seventeen firms with management
ownership less than 5 percent, eighteen firms with management ownership
between 5 percent and 25 percent, and nine firms with management ownership
greater than 25 percent.
Models (I}-(3) show that DECLAREE share price reactions to SDIK
announcements are increasingly negative as management becomes entrenched. In
all models, the coefficient representing firms with management ownership greater
than 25 percent (MGT3) is negative and statistically significant. The same relation
holds in models (2) and (3) for firms with management ownership concentration
between 5 percent and 25 percent (MGT2).8 The F-statistics of all models denote
overall significance at the 1 percent level, and the adjusted R2 values range from
0.236 to 0.415. Although such high explanatory power is uncommon in studies
of this nature, our regression diagnostics do not suggest the findings are unduly
influenced by outliers.
Additional analyses reveal that firms with management ownership of less
than 5 percent have a mean abnormal return of 0.40 percent, and that roughly half
of these firms experience share price decreases. For management ownership

·We also estimated the models presented in Table 3 using only one (continuous) management ownership
variable. With this procedure, the coefficient estimate for management ownership concentration was negative
and significant at the .001 level across all models. Coefficient signs and significance levels for the remaining
variables were consistent with those of the original models.
"Management ownership information is extracted from proxy statement filings before the SDIK distribution.
"All test statistics are calculated with OLS standard errors. Using White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-eonsistent
standard errors increases the statistical significance of all but one of the parameter estimates.
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TABLE 3. Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of DECLAREE Announcement-period Abnormal
Returns on a Set of Ownership Structure and Information-based Variables (p-values are in
parentheses).
Coefficient
Intercept
MGT!
MGT2
MGTJ

Model (2) (n = 44)

-0.010
(0.17)
0.548'
(0.08)
-0.081
(0.21)
-0.061"
(0.05)

0.001
(0.96)
0.432
(0.15)
-0.141"
(0.04)
-0.087"
(0.01)
-0.004"
(0.02)

0.004
(0.59)
0.208
(0.48)
-0.117'
(0.06)
-0.090"
(0.01)
-0.005"
(0.01)
0.052"
(0.02)

5.223
0.236

6.343
0.348

6.535
0.415

FIRMSIZE
POSTPRICE

F-statistic
Adjusted R'

= 44)

Model (I) (n = 44)

Model (3) (n

Notes: MGT! is management ownership for firms having management ownership less than 5 percent; MGT2
is management ownership for firms having management ownership between 5 percent and 25 percent; MGT3
is management ownership for firms having management ownership greater than 25 percent; FIRMSIZE is market
value of equity (coefficient should be multiplied by IOE-3); and POSTPRICE is abnormal returns cumulated
from day I to day 25.
"Significant at the 5 percent level.
'Significant at the 10 percent level.

between 5 percent and 25 percent, sixteen of the eighteen firms experienced a
negative price reaction. The mean abnormal return for this group is -1.80 percent,
with individual values from -6.20 percent to 3.70 percent. Finally, eight of the
nine firms with management ownership greater than 25 percent experienced
negative price reaction. The mean abnormal return for these firms is -3.31
percent, with individual values from -6.13 percent to 0.10 percent. The abnormal
returns for these three classes of firms are significantly different using a MannWhitney medians test (p = 0.05). Thus, these secondary analyses provide
additional evidence that price reactions to SDIK announcements become
increasingly negative as management ownership concentration increases (Fama
and Jensen (1983».
Models (2) and (3) in Table 3 expand our initial specification to control
for the size, as proxied by market value of equity, of the DECLAREE firm
(FIRM SIZE). Because large firms are likely to have more shareholders than small
firms, FIRMSIZE may be viewed as a proxy for ownership dispersion (Demsetz
and Lehn (1985». As ownership dispersion (i.e., FIRMSIZE) increases,
concentrated blocks of outside ownership become more important, and the
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dissolution of these blocks may be viewed negatively. Thus, from a monitoring
perspective, the coefficient for FIRMSIZE should be negative.
To the extent that less information about small firms is available to the
market, however, FIRMSIZE may act as a proxy for information asymmetry. If
this is the case, we would expect FIRMSIZE to have a positive coefficient,
reflecting a stronger negative reaction to SDIK announcements for small firms.
For this study, however, the reverse argument could be made. Specifically, most
of the DECLARER observations are very small investment companies that
ordinarily receive little media attention. Thus, the primary determinant of media
coverage for SDIKs is the size and/or relevance of the DECLAREE firm. Where
the DECLAREE firm is small as well, information about the SDIK generally is
disclosed as a line-item in "Dividend News" or comparable lists. Where the
DECLAREE firm is large, however, a complete news article generally conveys
the SDIK information. Under these circumstances, price reactions may be
expected to be more negative for large firms (i.e., a negative coefficient for
FIRMSIZE) because the information is more readily available.
The evidence in Table 3 documents a significantly negative relation
between abnormal returns and FIRMSIZE, and shows that the introduction of
FIRMSIZE contributes greatly to the model's explanatory power. The results
suggest that larger firms react more negatively to SDIK announcements,
consistent with the information asymmetry argument presented above. The
negative coefficient also suggests that FIRMSIZE may be a good proxy for
ownership dispersion. That is, larger firms may have more dispersed owners and
react more negatively to the dissolution of outside ownership blocks.
In model (3) we include a measure of potential information effects-the
post-period cumulative abnormal return calculated from day I through day 25
(POSTPRICE).9 Because DECLARER shareholders receive stock rather than a
cash dividend, they may choose to sell their shares, causing a short-term liquidity
effect. This selling pressure would create an initial drop in the stock price, which,
if no information is associated with the SDIK, would be reversed in the days
following the announcement. If such a liquidity effect is present, firms with the
most negative announcement-period returns should experience the greatest
rebounds, and a negative relation between abnormal returns and POSTPRICE
would be expected. If, however, DECLARER firms are correct that DECLAREE
values have peaked, poor post-period stock price performance and a positive
relation between abnormal returns and POSTPRICE would be expected. Table 3
reveals that the coefficient for POSTPRICE is positive and statistically significant.
This indicates that DECLARER firms time stock dividends to coincide with peaks
in DECLAREE firm values and that DECLAREE firms that experience the

·POSTPRICE was also calculated over days I to 50, days I to 75, and days I to 100. The sign of the
coefficient estimate remained positive and statistical significance decreased as the window was lengthened.
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TABLE 4. Selected Summary Statistics Regarding Institutional Ownership Characteristics of
DECLAREE Firms.
Measure

Mean

Number of institutional holders before announcement
79.64
83.24
Number of institutional holders after announcement
31.36
Number of institutions increasing their holdings after the announcement
35.00
Number of institutions decreasing their holdings after the announcement
-209,020
Net change in the number of shares held by institutions
31.42%
Proportion of institutions holding stakes larger than stake of DECLARER firm

Median
35
36
13
18
-62,400
32.57%

Note: Data were extracted from SPECTRUM; they represent twenty-five of the forty-four DECLAREE firms.

most negative post-period performance are subject to the greatest penalties when
negative signals (i.e., SDIKs) are initially sent.

Institutional Ownership Analysis-DECLAREE firms
Because institutional investors generally are regarded as sophisticated,
they may provide superior monitoring of the firms whose shares they hold.
Therefore, an examination of the nature of the institutional ownership of
DECLAREE firms may help delineate between information effects and monitoring
effects. Table 4 contains various measures of institutional ownership concentration, calculated using Spectrum III data. These data are available quarterly
beginning January I, 1979. Complete institutional ownership data for the quarter
immediately preceding and the quarter immediately following the SDIK
announcement are available for twenty-five of the forty-four sample firms."
For the relatively small subsample of firms with available data, we find
that the average number of institutional investors increases after the announcements from 79.6 to 83.2. This reveals that some institutional investors purchase
shares after the announcement, perhaps believing the shares may be a "good buy."
Although the number of institutional shareholders increases, the median number
of institutions that decrease their holdings (18) exceeds the median number of
institutions that increase their holdings (13). This indicates that more of the
current institutional shareholders believe share prices may continue to decline.
That the net change in the number of shares held by institutions as reported in
Spectrum III decreases by an average of 209,020 shares also supports this
contention. This summary information indicates that institutional shareholders may
view DECLAREE firm prospects negatively.

IOOne of the twenty-five firms had a six-month window surrounding the SDIK announcement instead of a
three-month window.
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Table 4 also reveals that the blocks of DECLARER firms' shares being
dissolved are larger than the blocks held by other institutions. In fact, on average
only one-third of the institutions holding DECLAREE shares have stakes larger
than the stake distributed by the dividend. Therefore, the monitoring provided by
DECLARER firms before the SDIK announcement may have been substantial. To
investigate the degree to which institutional monitoring influences DECLAREE
share price responses, we estimate numerous models using various institutional
ownership variables calculated using Spectrum III data. These variables include
(but are not limited to) the measures in Table 4, the number of institutions with
stakes greater than the DECLARER firms' stakes increasing (decreasing) their
holdings after the announcement, the number of institutions closing (opening)
their positions after the announcement, and the number of institutions with stakes
larger than the DECLARER firms' stakes closing (opening) positions after the
announcement. None of the proxies of institutional monitoring is significant at
conventional levels. This result may be due to the limited sample size and the
resulting OLS complications, or to our inability to capture the monitoring that the
DECLARER firms had provided. In short, this additional evidence does not
support the contention that DECLAREE firms' stock price reactions to SDIK
announcements are due to the loss of important monitoring provided by
DECLARER firms. Rather, it appears that SDIK announcements simply provide
a negative signal to the market about the future prospects of DECLAREE firms.

V. Conclusions
In this study we investigate a unique type of stock dividend that is
payable in the common shares of firms different from the issuing firm. We find
that these dividends typically are declared by investment companies. The shares
that are distributed exhibit significant price increases during the months before the
dividend declaration, with prices decreasing after the distribution. This suggests
SDIKs are declared when DECLARER firms believe the shares have reached their
maximum value. The average price response for DECLARER firms is positive,
consistent with both the signaling arguments and the pre-1987 preferential tax
treatment of SDIKs.
We document a significantly negative average announcement-period price
response for DECLAREE firms. Our tests suggest that the valuation effect of the
SDIK depends upon the pre-dividend level of management ownership. Firms with
low levels of management ownership concentration experience little change in
firm value when managerial strength is enhanced through SDIK announcements.
However, as management power and/or ownership dispersion increases, the price
response becomes increasingly negative. The decreasing DECLAREE share price
performance following SDIK announcements suggests share values had peaked.
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Furthermore, firms with the most negative announcement-period reactions also
have the worst post-period performance, indicating SDIKs send a negative signal
about DECLAREE firm value.
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